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Abstract 
Outside prison agents do not only choose a game strategy but also a game 
partner. In this paper players are finite automata and willing to interact 
only if their expected payoff exceeds an endogenously evolving acceptable 
minimum. In the resulting behavioural structure the initial population is 
subdivided according to players' degree of exploitiveness. If the number of 
cooperators is at least two, cooperators will be better off than defectors. If 
more successful automata reproduce, simulations show that due to partner 
selection cooperative behaviour is immune to invading mutants even if the 
life-span of generations is short. 
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1 Introduction 
Standard game theory has developed sophisticated methods to analyze strategic 
interactions. These methods single out optimal behaviour once economic agents are 
actually involved in a game. Until recently it has been overlooked that in sorne 
situations agents do not only choose how to play but also with whom to play. It is 
not reasonable to assume that agents behave optimally once they actually play but 
are completely blind in as far as partner selection is concerned. 
An obvious game for which introducing partner selection might make a difference 
is the prisoner's dilernma. In many economic situations which can be characterized 
as a prisoner's dilernma cooperation levels are surprisingly high. Many of them have 
a clear voluntary interaction structure. For example, fums choose their suppliers, 
joint research and development is done by common agreement, job search, quits and 
firing rely on the agents being able to condition their decisions on future expectations 
based on past behaviour. In past centuries, the prisoner's dilemma characterized 
nearly any important trade relationship. Due to the absence of legal enforcements in 
international trade a merchant had no guarantee besides the mutual interest in the 
continuity of the trade relationship that his trading partners would not rob him. A 
lot of mutual trust was required for international trade to arise; given the historical 
high level of trade there cannot be any doubts that this trust existed although the 
game structure is clearly a prisoner's dilernma. 
A recent example of the importance and strength of partner selection is Japanese 
management of supplier relations. Unlike the U.S. practice of using competitive bid-
ding in order to obtain low prices from their suppliers, Japanese automobile manu-
facturers use comparative performance evaluation. Efficient suppliers are rewarded 
by future additional supply contracts. The Japanese experience reveals that good 
performance is promoted. Moreover, suppliers tend to adapt to the company's needs 
and even to participate in product designio 
Thinking twice quickly leads to the conclusion that forced interactions seem to 
be the exception rather than the rule and that voluntary interactions lead to more 
cooperative behaviour. 
In recent years several economists and social scientists have tried to model part-
ner selection. The existing literature can be subdivided into three different cate-
gories: 
1. probabilistic matching models where players choose an action determining the 
probability with which they meet their potential game partners (Mailath et 
al. (1994) and Oechssler (1995)). 
2. random matching models with endogenous exit (Schluessler (1989), Vanberg 
and Congelton (1992), Peck (1993), Ghosh and Ray (1996), Orbell et al. (1984, 
1993,1996), Orbell and Dawes (1991) and Morikawa et al. (1995)). 
1 c.f. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) Chapter 16 
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3. Stanley et al. (1994) develop a choice and refusal mechanism2 for a small scale 
society in which players leave the realm of anonymity. Players can make game 
offers to specific players and accept or reject offers that they received. The de-
cision is reached by comparing expected payoffs if playing with an exogenously 
given fixed tolerance leve!. Repeated prisoner's dilemma strategíes are repre-
sented by finite automata and evolve vía genetic algoríthms. The emergence 
of cooperation is accelerated. Although full cooperation is the most frequently 
observed population structure, several other population structures - includ-
ing societies where everyone is inactive - arise, none of which are completely 
immune to invasion by mutants. Multiple tight payoff bands can emerge, 
reflecting the possible existence of multiple ecological attractors. 
Stanley et al. (1994)'s model has many attractive features: it allows for partner 
selection on different levels: agents can search for a game partner but they also 
can refuse a match. In contrast to most matching models the final outcome of the 
matching procedure is not only based on a priori beliefs3 . Players meet and thereby 
learn about each other. This learning has a feedback on whom they meet next. 
As in the real world, mismatches might occur, influencing expectations and future 
behaviour. 
However, the model has sorne features which makes it not very attractive as a 
model of economic agents. The main reason is that many of the underlying parame-
ters in the decision rules are specified exogenously and therefore can only be fixed 
arbitrarily. Especially a fixed tolerance level implies that agents might consistently 
reject and accept the wrong game offers since falling below the exogenous tolerance 
level is a dead end: in this case the potential game partner (and this might happen 
even to the best possible) will remain intolerable forever. In a later paper4 (Ashlock 
et al. (1994)) the authors endogenize the tolerance level by making it part of a 
player's genotype. This implies that evolution competes between tolerance levels 
fixed at different levels, to which the same criticism applies: a fixed tolerance level 
limits players learning capacities too much and condemns them to consistent errors. 
It seems like a commonly shared understanding among economists that while 
economic agents may be making mistakes for a while, they are unlikely to make 
the same mistakes forever. Since the choice and refusal mechanism reveals new 
information every period, any learning mechanism in an economic model ought to 
take this information into account and the tolerance level should adjust every periodo 
In the present paper the endogenous minimum tolerance level is determined as 
a moving average of the payoffs received in the last m periods. The moving average 
representation has the advantage that only relatively new information is relevant 
and gives players enough flexibility to adjust to sudden behavioural changes of their 
2The same mechanism is used by Ashlock et al. (1994) and Smucker et al. (1994). Tesfatsion 
(1995a) combines it with Gale and Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm. 
3Most matching models as summarized in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) describe some algorithm 
that leads to a stable match. On the adjustment path no new information is revealed. The stable 
match only depends on the priors of agents. 
4which was developed indepedently of the present paper. 
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partners. For m sufficiently largé the moving average representation has the nice 
property that the tolerance level will converge to a level which the player would 
choose conditional on the history of play if he were given the whole model and 
hence unbounded rationality. Therefore with our learning mechanism agents will 
not make mistakes forever. 
The endogenous tolerance level ensures that over time cooperators will exclu-
sively interact with each other and achieve higher fitness than exploitive strategies. 
This is shown analytically for the simply case of history independent repeated pris-
oner's dilemma (IPD) strategies. Simulations illustrate that this result extends to 
more general setups. Moreover, the simulations stress the relevance of this result 
since the speed of convergence is seen to be very fasto It is also shown analytically 
that for certain parameter restrictions even a single cooperator in an all defective 
world might be better off than defectors themselves. 
An endogenous tolerance level stresses that partner selection is an issue only if 
there are several potential game partners. If the population consists of two players 
only they will necessarily have to interact with each other. This is a further sub-
stantial difference to Stanley et al. (1994) whose only analytic results are play-stop 
conditions for sorne IPD strategies in a two-player world. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section the rnodel 
is spelt out and the fitness criterion is defined. Further differences to Stanley et 
al.(1994) will be explained and justified. In section 3 the importance of the initial 
period and the effectiveness of the mechanism in protecting cooperators is shown 
analytically. Section 4 concentrates on the effect of the mechanism on a given set of 
behavioural rules. Section 5 examines an evolutionary setup in which after several 
periods of the IPD (iterated prisoner's dilemma) tournament with choice and refusal 
a generation of automata dies and their offsprings inherit more successful autornata 
with sorne noise. Two different evolutionary setups are simulated which yield the 
same resulto In the presence of mutations preferential partner selection cornbined 
with strategy revision leads to stable cooperative play. The last section concludes 
and relates the present paper to its antecedents. 
2 The madel 
As a basic game the prisoner's dilemma (PD) game with two players is chosen. The 
payoff rnatrix is as follows. 
5In the model the minimum m used was 10, which will be seen to be sufficiently large. 
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cooperate defect 
C s 
cooperate 
C L 
L D 
defect 
S D 
Prisoner's Dilemma 
In the current setup aH payoffs are assumed to be nonnegative with S > C > 
D > L and S + L < 2C. The latter restriction ensures that altering plays of 
cooperation against defection with defection against cooperation does not result in 
a higher payoff than mutual cooperation. Players live in a smaH enough world to 
be able to recognize and remember past activities of their opponents. This enables 
them to select their game partners based on past experiences. 
Partner selection is modeled via a choice and refusal mechanism based on Stanley 
et al. (1994) and is repeated every time a new period begins. Like in Stanley 
et al.' s (1994) model players classify their opponents as acceptable (tolerable) or 
unacceptable (intolerable). An opponent is acceptable as a playing partner if the 
expected payoff 7r from this pairing exceeds a minimum tolerance level T. Each 
player will make a game offer to the acceptable player with the highest expected 
payoff. A possible tie is broken by randomization. In the next step aH received 
game offers with 7r < Tare rejected while any acceptable offer is accepted. Accepted 
offers lead to a one-:.period play of the prisoner's dilemma6 . Players making mutual 
game offers to each other only play one PD game7• The resulting payoffs from these 
interactions are incorporated into both expected payoffs and the tolerance level. 
Herein lies the main difference to Stanley et al. (1994) who use a fixed exogenously 
given mínimum tolerance level. 
Expectations are updated as follows. As in Stanley et al. (1994) the expected 
payoff for each pairing is revised using a weighted average of the past expectation 
and the present payoff U received from the pairing. Let w be the memory weight. 
Formally, the expected payoff of player i from playing player j in period s is 
6This implies that a player might play several PD games with the upper bound depending on 
the number of players he judged to be acceptable. This modeling assumption is necessary in order 
for each rejection to convey the same type of information, namely that the player was unacceptable. 
If a capacity constraint on the number of received PD offers that can be accepted was introduced, 
a rejection would convey an ambiguous message. This would distort the pure effects of partner 
selection on cooperation levels. 
The capacity constraint on the number of offers that can be made can be dropped easily resulting 
in players meeting each other sooner. Therefore, long-run acceptable and unacceptable game 
partners would be seperated earlier. 
7This modeling assumption can be modified. Throughout the paper it will be pointed out 
how mutual offers leading to two PD games would influence the results. It will be seen that no 
substantial changes occur. 
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~( ') = { W7r:- 1(j) + (1 - W)U : if offer made or game 
7rt J 7r:-1(j) : otherwise (1) 
Each player i initially assigns the same expected payoff 7rp = 7rp(j) 'r:/j to each of 
its potential partners. But 7r? can differ for different players i. It will be assumed 
that 7r? reflects a player's initial intentions. If he cooperates in the first round, 
7rp = e, if he defects 7rp = S. The maximal payoff of each possible strategy is 
chosen since a player chooses a strategy which he believes to be successful8 . 
Expected payoffs for a pairing are only revised if new information concerning 
this potential game partner is received. This is the case if the PD game was played 
with or if an offer was made to this potential partner but was rejected. In the latter 
case U = O. This is a further difference to Stanley et al. (1994) who allow for a 
general refusal payoff R ~ O. In most economic models the refusal payoff should be 
endogenous and depend on the relative cost and potential payoff of the refused offer. 
Obviously, a refused offer will be less painful if other good game offers are received 
than if they are noto However, given that in the aboye model offers are not rejected 
because there is a better alternative, but because past interactions were conceived as 
negative, an endogenous refusal payoff would be non-sensical. Players do not know 
who is going to make them an offer, nor is there any information spill-over among 
players. The restriction to R = O is appealing since the only function of the refusal 
payoff in the model is to discourage repeated game offers to somebody who is likely 
to reject the offer since he has already rejected it at least once. 
The updating rule was chosen in order to facilitate comparison with Stanley et 
al. (1994). The main results of this paper seem to be fairly insensitive to the exact 
specification of the updating rule. Bayesian updating is prone to lead to the same 
results. The key characteristic required for the updating rule is that expected payoffs 
fall if the actually experienced payoff is lower than the expected payoff and raise if 
it is higher but never fall (raise) below (above) the level of the actually experienced 
payoff. Any reasonable updating rule fulfills this criterion. 
The endogenous minimum tolerance level is determined as a moving average of 
the payoffs against all opponents in the last m periods. If a player does not receive 
any payoff in a period, since he has classified everybody as unacceptable the payoff 
of this period is 09 . Let Üis be the average payoff of player i in period S. Formally 
his tolerance level Tis in period s is: 
s<m 
s~m 
8Note that in Stanley et al. (1994) everybody has the same 1l'? 
(2) 
9Similarly to the rejection payoff, Stanely et al. (1994) allow this payoff which they refer 
to as wallflower payoff to be positive. It is unclear how to interpret a positive wallflower payoff. 
Moreover, as argued in the introduction, partner selection does not mean self-isolation, but selecting 
the best feasible partner. A positive wallflower payoff could result in a playstop forever, while a 
zero wallflower payoff will noto 
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The initial tolerance level is arbitrarily set equal to zero in order to ensure that 
an inexperienced player is willing to play with everybody. This initial tolerance 
level does not enter into the calculation of future tolerance levels. The average 
representation is chosen for the following reasons: the minimum tolerance level 
ought to reflect a player's experience. Initially, the average payoff a player receives 
captures the mixed behaviour of the existing player population from his point of 
view and is an indication of which payoff level can be demanded. In early periods 
the average payoff is the best estimate oí average behaviour a player has given his 
information. He attempts to meet ahove average partners. This behaviour will 
introduce a bias into the sample, leading the tolerance level to represent the average 
behaviour oí his "supposedly" best playing partners. Representing the tolerance 
level as a moving average has the advantage that as time progresses only relatively 
new information is relevant. Players could have an IPD strategy that entails sudden 
switches from deíection to cooperation or vice versa; the moving average ensures, 
that should this happen, the former game partners will adopt quickly to the new 
situation. 
2.1 Criteria of relative performance 
Let s denote time. Let Uijs denote the payoff player i achieves against player j in 
iteration s. By definition Uiis = O and Uijs = O Vj such that i does not get matched 
with j. Now we are in a position to define the following fitness criterion. 
Mean total payoff: MTP 
(3) 
Notice that MTP rewards players that attract many acceptable playerslO • 
3 Analyzing choice and refusaI 
3.1 The initial round of each tournament 
In the initial period random offers are made. In order to be able to characterize 
all possible first period outcomes, it is convenient to divide players into two groups. 
Nice and nasty players. 
Definition 1 In Axelrod's (1g84) terminology a player is nice if the initial state of 
his repeated game strategy is cooperative. Otherwise a player is said to be nasty. 
lOThis is not the only possible fitness criterion. Stanely et al. (1994) use an alternative criterion, 
namely the sum of payoffs divided by the total number of payoffs with the latter including the 
times a player made an offer that was rejected (and also the times a player did not play anybody). 
Throughout the paper 1 shall point out how results would be modified if this criterion were used. 
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Let nc be the nurnber of nice strategies in the population. Let Xc be the nurnber 
of offers received frorn cooperators by player i. Strictly speaking Xc should have a 
player subscript, which we suppress since the analysis concentrates on an individual 
pI ayer i. Xd and nd are defined accordingly. The following tables characterize the 
different situations of nice and nasty strategies respectively. It shows the probability 
of each initial event and its resulting tolerance level. The exact derivation of the 
probabilities can be found in appendix B. In order to facilitate comparison the 
following sirnplifications are rnadell . First sorne notation. Let 
_ (n- 2t-2- zc 
Pe - (n-l)n 1 
_ (n_2)n-2- zd 
Pd - (n-l)n 1 
_ (n_2)n-2- Z d-Zc 
Pcd - (n-l)n 1 
T refers to the tolerance level. 
initial cooperator (nice) 
offer made to cooperator offer made to defector 
offers from probability T probability T ( r-2 ( r-2 no/mutual n-2 e n-2 L n-1 n-1 
cooperators (nc - 1) (n~:2)pc e nd(n~:l)pc L+xcC xc+1 
defectors (nc -l)(~=)Pd C+xdL n (nd- 1)p L xd+1 d Xd d 
both (n c _1)(n~:2) (~=)Pcd C+xd L+x•C n (nd- 1) (nc-1)p L+XáL+xoC l+xd+xc d Xd Xc cd l+xd+xc 
Table 1 
The colurnns show whether the nice strategy rnade an offer to another initial 
cooperator or to a defector. 
11 If mutual offers led to two games, the following probabilities would be of interest, too. 
( )
n-1 
With p = ~=~ the player receives no offer. 
( )
2 ( )n-2 ( 2)n-2 With p = (n - 1) n~l ~=~ = (~=ljn-¡ he receives only a mutual offer 
With p = (n;l) (~~i~:l~'" he receives exactly x < n offers one of which might be mutual. 
With p = (n;2) (~~[¡:"'~2 he receives exactly one mutual offer and x futher offers. 
Given these probabilities it is easy to see how to characterize initial play under the modified 
assumption. 
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initial defector 
offer made to cooperator offer made to defector 
offers from probability r probability r ( r-2 ( r-2 no/mutual n-2 S n-2 D n-I n-I 
cooperators (nc-I) S (nd -l)(~:)Pe xcS±D ne Xc Pe xc±1 
defectors n (nd-I)p e Xd d S±xdD (nd _1)(n~~2)Pd D I±xd 
both n (nc- I ) (nd-I)p S±xdD±xoS (nd - 1) (n~~2) (~:) Ped D±xdD±xoS e Xc Xd cd I±xd±xc I±xd±xc 
Table II 
These distinct formulas throw sorne light on the analytical complexities of the 
choice and refusal mechanism. It results in a strongly branched sequential game. 
Calculations in later rounds get even much more complicated as further branching 
occurs. Moreover, in order to determine the set of acceptable players for each agent 
i one has to keep track of the entire history of play of all agents. Consequently, 
due to this combinatorial explosion of possible partnership configurations, an ana-
lytic analysis without the introduction of further restrictions is impossible. In the 
remainder of this section analytical results for sorne special cases are proven that 
will capture the main reasons why choice and refusal favours cooperative behaviour. 
The aboye analysis of the initial round will facilitate the proof of proposition 3.1. 
3.2 How cooperators are protected. 
3.2.1 An illustration in the three player case 
Consider the extreme case of two AllD (player Y and Z) and one AllC (player 
X) players. Then the following four initial constellations can happen with equal 
probability 
• X plays Y, Y plays both X and Z, Z plays Y 
• X plays Z, y plays Z, Z plays both X and Y 
• X plays both Y and Z, y plays X, Z plays X 
• all three players play two games 
If there was random matching in the sense that each player made one random 
offer which had to be accepted the following expected payoffs would be received 
• The cooperator X would receive ~L. 
• The defectors Y and Z would each receive ~ (D + S). 
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When introducing refusal, each of the four possible initial states has to be ana-
lyzed. 
Consider first the state in which player X plays Y, Y plays X and Z, while player 
Z plays Y which shall be denoted by XY - YXZ - ZY. Expect X or Y or Z refers to 
the expected payoff the player in the column player has when considering to play 
against X, Y or Z respectively. 
1 round 1 history of play 11 player 1 expect X 1 expect Y expect Z 1 tol.level 1 neW offer 
X (C -L)w+L C L to player Z 
1 XY-YZX-ZY y 8 D+(8 -D)w ~ to player X 
Z 8 D+ (8 -D)w D to player X 
X (C -L)w'L. +L (C - L)w+L L to player Z 
2 XYZ-YX-ZX y 8 D+ (8- D)w -~ to player X 
Z 8 D+ (8-D)w 
_T to player X 
X (C - L)w",j +L (C - L)w'L. +L L to player Z 
3 XYZ-YX-ZX y 8 D+ (8 -D)w ~ to player X 
Z 8 D+ (8 -D)w ~ to player X 
Table III 
After round 3 neither history nor the offer structure change any further. The 
expectations of player X when playing Y and Z fall towards L while Y's and Z's 
tolerance level adapt as follows 
1 player 11 1 2 3 4 5 t 
y D+S D+3S D+5S D+7S D+9S D+(2t-l).'; 
---"? ~ -¡; ~ 10 'Jt 
Z D D+S D+2S D+3S D+4S D+tt-l)S ~ --:¡- -¡- ~ t 
Table IV 
Clearly both tolerance levels slowly approach S. Should the number of iterations 
a player can remember be restricted to m, in period m+ 1 both Y's and Z's tolerance 
level would jump to S immediately. 
The second case in which the original history XZ-YZ-ZXY is observed, is identical 
to the first case with the roles of Y and Z reversed. 
Consider the fourth case next: 
I round I history 1I player I expect X I expect Y expect Z I tol.level I new offer I 
X (C-L)w+L (C - L)w + L L to either 
1 XYZ-YXZ-ZXY y 8 D+ (8 -D)w T toX 
Z 8 D+(8-D)w T toX 
X (C-L)w'L. +L (C- L)w'L. +L L to either 
2 XYZ-YX-ZX y 8 D+(8-D)w ~ 
Z 8 D+(8 -D)w ~ 
Table V 
From round 2 onwards, X will make random offers while Y and Z will always 
make an offer to X 
The third case includes all other cases since offers will be random in the second 
round. 
The following table summarizes the payoffs in the different cases 
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to X 
to X 
I player" case 1 case 2 case 4 
X L+lt 1)2L L+(t 1)2L 2L t t 
Y D+tS D+(t-l)S D+(t-l)S ~ t t 
Z D+(t-l)S D+tS D+(t-l)S t ~ t 
Table VI 
Anytime case 3 occurs, all other cases might occur in the next periodo If this 
happens the payoffs are the same as if the respective case had been entered directly. 
Otherwise case 3 gives a payoff of 2L to X, and of S to both Y and Z. This happens 
1 e)t 
with probability CVt while entering another case from case 3 has probability ¡-l . 
Letting t -+ 00 the expected payoffs for the different players converge to 2L for 
X and to S for Y and Z12. If L > O the cooperative type is better off under choice 
and refusal. The defectors are better off if S > 3D. While they can coordinate 
on exploiting the nice player, they miss out the chance of playing several games 
resulting from random behaviour13 . 
3.2.2 Extension of the result to the n player case with n-1 AIID players 
and one AIIC player 
The aboye result is true in general: 
Proposition 3.1 In an n player population with nc = 1 and nd = n - 1 the choice 
and relusal mechanism in the long ron will lavour the coopemtor as long as L > O. 
To see this point notice that when t -+ 00 the average expected payoff of defec-
tors approaches S while for the cooperator it approaches (n - l)L. Under random 
behaviour the cooperator would have the following expected per period payoff with 
U=L. 
Lernrna 3.1 11 everybody is equally attmctive to a player over all periods 01 the 
tournament, his expected per period payoff will be 
2n-3 
--U 
n-1 
where U is the payoff he achieves in a single game. 
Proof: see appendix e 
(4) 
12If mutual offers lead to two games, payoffs converged to 3L for X. The defectors would receive an 
average payoff of !S. In this case the defectors would be always better off under choice and refusal 
as well. However, the cooperator would be even better off than under the original assumption. 
13Under Stanley et al. (1994)'s fitness criterion this result does not hold since it does not reward 
players who play several games at the same time. 
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Under random behaviour the expected per period payoff for each defector is given 
by the foIlowing formula. 
1 
( 2)
n-2 2 ( 2)n-2 n- n- n-
-- -- 8+-- -- D 
n-1 n-1 n-1 n-1 
n-2 (n _ 2) (n - 2)n-2-Xd (n _ 2)n-2 
+ ~l Xd (n - 1)n-l (8 + DXd) + (n _ 1)n-l (D + 8) 
n-3 (n _ 3) (n - 2)n-l-Xd n-3 (n - 3) (n _ 2)n-2-Xd 
+ ~ Xd (n - l)n-l (D + DXd) + ~ Xd (n _ l)n-l (D +8 + DXd) 
The formula is derived with the help of table n, illustrating the probabilities of 
the different types of offers a defector gets under random behaviour14• E.g. the first 
term n~l (~=~r-2 8 illustrates the case that the defector made the offer to the only 
cooperator which happens with probability n~l and did not play any further games 
which happens with probability (~=~r-2. The resulting payoff is 8. 
As an illustration consider a setup with five players. Under random behaviour 
the expected average payoff is {68 + ~~ D which is worse than the payoff achieved 
under the choice and refusal mechanism only if 8> tD. 
3.2.3 Two AIIC players in an all defective world 
Suppose the population mix is such that there are only two cooperators and n - 2 
defectors. 
Proposition 3.2 Jf there are at least two cooperators among only defectors and 
e > 2D cooperators will be better off in the long runo 
Proo!, Initially defectors will be able to rip off the two cooperators. However, 
as soon as the cooperators have met everybody once and hence also discovered each 
other, they will exclusively make offers to each other, thereby achieving a payoff of 
C. Over sorne time period, they will also play with defectors, but the payoff they 
achieve from mutual cooperation wiIl push up their tolerance level, till cooperators 
reject any offer coming from a defector. Thus cooperators wiIl get e from that 
moment onwards15• Defectors will have to content themselves with other defectors. 
In the best situation they make an offer and receive a non-mutual offer, thus the 
average payoff of defectors approaches 2D. If n -+ 00, by lemma 3.1 the expected per 
period payoff when everybody is defective ~-=-13 D = 2D. When t -+ 00 the initial 
payoffs become irrelevant. If a generation lives long enough cooperators are better 
14Recall that in the initial period offers are made at random. 
15Notice that if mutual offers led to two games, cooperators would be in an even better position 
getting 2C always. AIso their tolerance level would be pushed towards the cooperative level more 
quickly. 
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off under MTP as long as e > 2D while under Stanley et al. (1994)'s criterion they 
are trivially better off, since e > D always. o 
The proof of proposition 3.2 illustrates and explains the main reason why the 
mechanism favours cooperative behaviour. It nicely illustrates the importance of 
the endogenous tolerance level. Although in this simple setup a elever choice of 
the exogenous tolerance level could yield the same result, an endogenous tolerance 
level ensures this result at a higher speed since initial expectations and the tolerance 
level adjust simultaneously. Moreover, the simultaneous adjustment entails the key 
of cooperative success even in a more complicated setup with a richer strategy mix. 
Clearly, no exogenous tolerance level exists which could ensure this outcome for all 
possible strategy mixes. 
The next section shows with the help of simulations that this analytic result does 
extend to a wider set of strategies. The simulations also address the important issue 
of the speed of convergence. The proof of proposition 3.2 required t -+ 00, Le. that 
generations live long enough. The simulations reveal that living long enough is not 
asevere restriction since convergence is extremely fasto 
4 Simulating choice and refusal 
In the simulation reported below 5 different automata are used. The following table 
shows how the row automaton reacts to the column automaton's strategy. 
AllD Rip I TFT I TFTT I AllC 
AllD (D,D,D,D,D, ..... ) 
Rip (D,C,D,D,D,D, ... ) (C,D,C,C,C,C, ... ) I (D,C,D,C,D,C, .... ) 
TFT (C,D,D,D,D,D, ... ) (C,D,C,C,C,C, .... ) I (C,C,C,C,C, .... 
TFTT (C,C,D,D,D,D, .. ) (C,C,C,C,C, .... ) 
AIIC (C,C,C,C,C .... ) 
Table VII 
An exact machine representation of the automata can be found in appendix A 16. 
The aboye automata were chosen for two reasons. 
1. Stanley et al. (1994) used exactly those machines in order to illustrate sorne 
properties of their model. Using the same machines facilitates comparison. 
2. The aboye machines seem to capture actual behaviour very well. In experi-
ments conducted by Hauk (1996) it was observed that about 90 - 95% of the 
experimental subjects used one of the aboye strategies. Interestingly, Rip was 
used rather than Tat-for-Tit17• 
16 Additional simulations with different automata were also runo The major results were not 
affected. 
17Notice that two Rips playing each other will be indistinguishable from two Tat-for-Tits playing 
each other. However, Tat-for-Tit will never start cooperation if its partner never defects. Rip 
always cooperates in the second periodo Tat-for-Tit will not end up cooperating with TFT while 
Rip will. Experimental subjects used Rip because it allowed them to exploite the opponent just a 
little without risking stable cooperative play in the long-runo 
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Simulations were written in Mathematica. About 100 different setups were run 
using the aboye automata varying population sizes and mixes. Each setup was 
examined in a 100 independent realizations. 5 pi ayer societies were the smallest 
and 20 pi ayer societies the largest used in the simulations. The following parameter 
values were used. S = 5, e = 3, D = 1 and L = O. Since L f O proposition 3.1 does 
not apply and a single cooperator in an all defective world will always perform worse 
than the defectors. In the basic setup the memory weight was w = 0.7. For the 
calculation of the minimum tolerance level T memory was restricted to 10 periods 
(m = 10) in 5 to 10 players societies, to 15 periods in 10 to 15 players societies and 
to 20 in 15 to 20 players societies. 
4.1 The most interesting findings 
Definition 2 A strategy is exploitive if it switches to defection although both play-
ers cooperated in the last period or although it is their first encounter. 
Definition 3 Provocability is a strategy's propensity to switch to defective behav-
iour if it is defected against. 
Simulations show that the analytic results using the simple strategies AllC and 
AllD extend to a more general setup18. In all realizations the society splits into 
exclusive subpopulations over time. The first subpopulation to form is the group 
of nonexploitive strategies. As argued in proposition 3.2 this happens in two steps. 
First nonexploitive strategies learn to make exclusive offers to people from this 
group. Having never defected, they form the most preferred set of opponents. Ex-
ploitive types continue making offers to nonexploitive strategies, however, the sta-
ble cooperate-cooperate relationship pushes up the tolerance level while expected 
payoff against exploiters falls, till exploitive strategies become unacceptable. Conse-
quently, nonexploitive strategies exclusively interact with each other in the long-run 
and their tolerance level will converge to the cooperative payoff, while exploitive 
strategies are condemned to interact with other exploitive strategies. As a result 
nonexploitive strategies19 clearly perform better20 quickly reaching the cooperative 
payoff on average. 
This result is true independently of the population size. The bigger the popula-
tion size, the longer it takes for the subpopulations to emerge. The subpopulations 
among exploitive types will form later than the subpopulation of cooperators. If the 
population size is doubled, the time required for the exclusive nonexploitive subpop-
ulation to develop is less than twice as long. The underlying intuition is simple: if 
the population is larger, exploitive types can rip off other players during more pe-
riods, leading to an initially high tolerance leve!. This tolerance level induces them 
to content themselves much later with other exploitive types. 
N otice that the speed for the formation of subpopulations is fast in any case. 
Using reasonable population sizes (up to 20) - players have to be able to recognize 
18Detailed simulation results can be obtained from the author by request. 
19as long as there is more than 1. 
20this is true using both MTP or Stanley et al. (1994)'s criterion. 
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their opponents - it always took less than 15 periods for nonexploitive types to 
perform better than exploitive types. 
The aboye findings are robust to a sensitivity anaIysis with respect to the memory 
weight w and higher upper memory bounds m for the tolerance level T. The memory 
weight w infiuences the speed with which the subpopulations formo The lower w, 
the higher the speed. A higher m prolongs the periods of contact between some of 
the exploitive and nonexploitive types21 • 
Appendix D illustrates some of the aboye findings for two of the simulation setups 
used. 
5 Evolving IPD strategies 
The aboye analysis with fixed IPD strategies suggests that if each generation of finite 
automata gets replaced by their offspring generation that inherits the more successful 
strategies with sorne noise, nonexploitive types are likeIy to win the evolutionary 
race. The following simulations show that this is indeed the case. 
Suppose that a generation of automata can only live r periods in which they use 
the choice and refusal mechanism to select their partners. When a generation dies, a 
new generation is born in which the more successful strategies of the old generation 
are more likely to be reproduced. The rank of each strategy is determined using 
MT P and averaging over all automata of the same type22 • Two different setups will 
be examined: 
1. strategy adjustment is local. This means that a child cannot differ too much 
from its parent but can only change its degree of provocability and exploitive-
ness slightly. In short, it can only become a bit more or less cooperative. This 
type of local mutations can be easily defined when restricting the analysis to 
the five automata used earlier on. An AllD parent can produce as the most 
cooperative strategy a Rip offspring. Rip can create AllD or TFT. TFT can 
produce Rip or TFTT who can create TFT or AllC while AllC cannot become 
more provocable than TFTT. Of course every parent can reproduce its own 
strategy. Every parent will create that strategy out of its available set that 
has performed best in its generation. If sorne strategy does not exist in a 
generation, the one step more or less cooperative strategy is relevant in deter-
mining whether the missing strategy will be born. Should a strategy, which is 
not AllC, be ranked best, and there are only less cooperative automata in the 
generation, this strategy will either reproduce itself or the one-step more coop-
erative strategy. SimiIarly, if the best ranked automata is the most defective 
living automata but not AllD. 
Reproduction is noisy, Le. there is a constant probability p of giving birth 
to the second best child only. The same probability of mutation applies once 
21namely between Rip and TFT. 
22This differs from Stanley et al. (1994) where the x best machines enter the next tournament 
and mutations and crossovers thereof. 
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every automata in a generation is of the same t:vpe. 
If there is a tie in the ranks, the tie is broken by a random draw. With 
probability 1 - p the first best child is born. If two (or three) strategies 
out of a parent's feasibIe set have performed best, each of them is adopted 
with probability ~ (or ~). The case of the second best child is defined 
accordingly. 
2. Strategy adjustment is global. With probability A the offspring' s strategy can 
be revised. Should this happen, the offspring will inherit the best automaton 
with probability 1 - p. With probability p an error occurs. This means that 
either the second best strategy is adopted or a strategy that is not present 
among the parent automata. Possible ties are again broken by a random 
draw. 
The two mechanisms for strategy revision have in cornmon that strategies can 
only be revised slowly and subject to sorne noise. The second mechanism is more 
general. The first mechanism is of interest because it models the belief that an IPD 
strategy reflects sorne deeper characteristics of a pI ayer and can therefore not be 
changed so easily. 
Simulations were mainly made in 5 (or 10) player setups with the number of 
tournaments before strategy revision r = 10 (or r = 15) under mechanism 1 and 
r = 20 (or r = 30) under mechanism 223 • The short tournaments favour defective 
types. The same parameters as in the basic setup without strategy revision were 
chosen. A was set to 0.5. More or less noisy setups were examined with maximal 
noise p = 0.1. 5 pI ayer simuIations examine 50 iterations of strategy revision while 
10 player simulations use 100 iterations (i.e. 500 and 1000 periods). Each setup was 
examined in 100 independent realizations. As will be seen beIow if there is sorne 
noise (p > O) simulation results are independent of initiaI conditions. 
The simulations show that the two mechanism lead to the same major resulto 
Qnly the path of adjustment differs. 
Observation 1 Given the five automata, noisy strategy revision combined with pref-
erential partner selection leads to stable cooperative play. Exploitive mutants are not 
able to invade a society of nonexploitive types. 
The underlying intuition is as follows. Choice and refusal protects nonexploitive 
strategies perfectly as long as there is more than one nonexploitive strategy in a 
generation. These types will quickly Iearn to direct their offers to other nonexploitive 
pIayers and will thereby achieve the cooperative payoff. The Iatter will raise their 
tolerance level inducing them to reject exploiters. Consequently exploitive automata 
are unable to take sufficient advantage of nonexploitive pIayers in order to achieve 
23Mechanism 2 allows for more drastic strategy changes. The higher r was chosen in order to 
ensure that subpopulations can evolve before strategy revision occurs. Notice that in general the 
higher r, the better for nonexploitive strategies since they will enjoy more exploitation-free periods. 
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a higher payoff than the latter. Nonexploitive players get ranked higher and more 
offsprings will adopt a nonexploitive strategy. 
If, however, there is only one nonexploitive automaton in a generation, the choice 
and refusal mechanism cannot protect it from being exploited. Given the payoff 
structure of the simulation its payoff in every single game when being exploited is 
zero. TFTT and AllC will perform worse than exploitive strategies. But also TFT 
will achieve a lower rank than only AllD players. In the absence of mutations initial 
population constellations exist that would 1ead to exploitive offspring generations. 
But exploitive automata are not immune to mutations. To understand why, observe 
the following. 
1. Two simultaneously effective mutations are sufficient to destabilize a society 
of only AllD players. This is true for both evolutionary mechanisms described 
aboye. Under mechanism 1 two simultaneous mutations to Rip occur with 
probability p2. These two mutants have a clear advantage over AllD by co-
operating with each other. In the other mechanism not every strategy can 
be revised after the end of a tournament. If only one mutation occurs, the 
mutant might be stuck with this strategy for several tournaments. Being the 
only mutant he will be worse off. But as soon as another strategy mutates, 
AllD willlose its favourable position. Now the mutants can be of any type. 
If both of them are Rip or nonexp10itive strategies, they will gain the evolu-
tionary race by cooperating with each other. If one is Rip and the other one 
nonexploitive, Rip will gain unless the nonexploitive type is TFT. In this case 
who of the two wins will depend on random factors, especially on the number 
of interactions that occurred with AllD24. 
2. Under mechanism 1 AllD societies will be replaced by a society of Rips. Only 
one mutation to TFT is required to move from only Rip to nonexploitive 
strategies. In the first encounter Rip defects against Rip but receives the 
sucker payoff against TFT. Hence TFT will be the most attractive partner of 
every single Rip. In any period of the tournament TFT will play with each 
Rip. The 10ss of the first encounter is off-set by the second-period punishment 
and the stab1e cooperative encounter from the third encounter onwards25. 
3. Under mechanism 2 depending on the nature of mutations one might move 
directly from an AllD society to nonexploitive play. Otherwise, a society of 
only Rips will occur. By the same argument as under point 2 one TFT mutant 
will destabilize this society. So will two nonexploitive mutants which are not 
TFT by rejecting Rip who learns to play with the other Rips much 1ater than 
the nonexploitive mutants exclusively interact with each other. 
24notice that the destabilization of AllD societies under two simultaneously effective mutations 
remains valid even if we allow for a much richer diversity of automata. 
25Notice that if Stanley et al. (1994)'s criterion of average fitness were used, there would be a 
tie. Nevertheless nonexploitive play would be reached as soon as a society with two TFTs arose. 
The presence of another nonexploitive type makes Rip an unaccepable long-run partner for TFT 
due to its initial aggresitivity. 
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The destabilization of nonexploitive societies is not impossible but very unlikely. 
Under mechanism 1 it can only happen, if everybody is TFT and simultaneously 
mutates to Rip. In the case of everybody mutating to Rip mechanism 2 will also lead 
to a breakdown of cooperation. Additionally under mechanism 2 simultaneously 
effective mutations of everybody but 1 automata to AllD players will destabilize 
mutual cooperative play. If no TFT automata was present among the nonexploitive 
types, so will a simultaneously effective mutation of everybody but one player to Rip. 
The bigger the society, the more unlikely such a destabilization of only nonexploitive 
play26. 
6 Conclusion and relation to the literature 
The aboye analysis has shown that cooperation can be expected if players live in a 
small community and can choose and refuse potential game partners. The modifi-
cations made to Stanley et al. (1994)'s model, which were induced by the intuition 
that economíc agents do not make consistent errors, lead to a substantial difference 
in the results. In the present paper the evolution of cooperation is robust while in 
Stanley et al. (1994) stable behavioural patterns that are not entirely cooperative 
arise. Especially if their exogenous tolerance level is not suitably high, long-term 
parasitic relationships can form implying that agents interact with sub-optimal part-
ners forever. In the present model parasitic relationships are not sustainable since 
the tolerance level will evolve aboye the expected payoff against the parasite over 
time. Hence the parasite will be revealed as a parasite and become unacceptable. 
Stanley et al. (1994) also mention the possibility of so-called wallflower traps caused 
by high w and high T, in which no interactions take place and people live like an-
tisocial hermits. This cannot happen in the present model. Inactivity results in a 
lower mínimum tolerance level which will eventually be low enough for activity to 
take off the ground. Moreover, Stanley et al. (1994)'s model is very sensitive to 
the exact values of w, T and initial expectations 7ro and their interdependence. Our 
results are robust to changes is w but require for a sensible interpretation of the 
model reasonably high values of 7ro. If initial expectations are too low, sorne players 
might become intolerable in the short-run on the basis of initial expectations alone, 
Le. interactions míght be refused before the first interaction has taken place. Since 
in the long-mn the mechanism will correct this to a large extent by the evolving 
minimum tolerance level, the restriction to reasonably high 7r0 is imposed for a sen-
sible interpretation of the mechanism not because the mechanism would not work 
without the restriction. The major reason why our mechanism is much less sensi-
tive to the specification of the model parameters is that the endogenous T entails 
the possibility that an intolerable player can come back into favour. In contrast in 
Stanley et al.(1994) becoming intolerable is a dead end. 
This feature is carried over into a later paper by Smucker et al. (1994) in which 
the authors endogenize T by incorporating it into the genetic material of a pi ayer and 
letting evolution decide. Notice that this implies that in one generation each player 
26It is obvious that the same arguments hold if mutual offers led to two games. 
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still has got a fixed but personal 7. This endogenization of 7 preserves the main 
difficulty of an exogenous 7, namely that it will either be too low to protect players 
from exploitation or too high to allow for the formation of profitable partnerships 
that only establish after sorne periods of initial exploitation. The possibility of 
consistent errors is preserved. The present endogenization of 7 is attractive since it 
allows boundedly rational players to learn what is best for them. 
A The automata 
d 
AllD 
TFT 
d 
die 
d e 
Rip 
Figure 7 
AllC 
c 
TFTT 
The aboye representation uses Mealy machines. Each automaton makes an open-
ing move which is indicated next to the arrow entering stage 1, and then enters stage 
1. Thereafter, the next move is conditioned on the previous move of the opposing 
playero The letter before I refers to the opponent's move and is followed by the 
automaton's own reaction. 
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B The initial period 
We shall derive the probability distribution for the initial cooperator in the initial 
period 
1. offer made to cooperator 
( a) offers from cooperators 
Let Xc be the number of cooperative offers 
with 1 ::; Xc ::; nc - 2 
(~::::i)n-l-Xc is the probability that n - 1 - Xc players do not make our 
cooperator an offer 
(":;~l) (n_1l)Xc (n~:2) is the probability that Xc players made an offer to the 
cooperator who made a cooperative offer 
+(nc -1) (n(~C~:-xc (n~~2) is the probability that Xc + 1 cooperative offers 
were made to our cooperator but one was mutual. 
(b) offers from defectors 
Xd is the number of cooperative offers with 1 ::; Xd ::; nd 
(nc - 1) (n(~)~;):-Xd C~) is the probability that there was a mutual coop-
erative offer and Xd offers from defectors 
( e) offers from both 
2. offer made to defector (first iteration) 
( a) offers from cooperators 
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nd(n(~C;):-xc (n~l) is the probability that there was a defective mutual 
offers and Xc offers from cooperators 
(b) offers from defectors 
( e) offers from both 
Let us turn to the (initial) defector. The probability of receiving no ofié or a 
mutual offer is the same as for the cooperator. The further probabilities are 
1. the defector under consideration makes an offer to a cooperator 
(a) he receives only cooperative nonmutual offers 
( 2) n-l-xc 1 ( 1) n - nc nc-n - 1 n - 1 (n - l)xc Xc 
(n - 2)n-2-xc (nc - 1) 
+nc ( ) n -1 n Xc 
(b) he receives only defective nonrnutual offers 
( e) he receives cooperative and defective nonrnutual offers 
2. the defector under consideration makes an offer to a defector 
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(a) he receives only cooperative nonmutual offers 
( 2) n-1-XC 1 1 () 71, - nd - nc 71, - 1 71, - 1 (71, - 1)xc Xc 
(71, - 2)n-2-xc (nc) 
+(nd - 1) ( ) 
71, - 1 n Xc 
(b) he receives only defective nonmutual offers 
( c) he receives both defective and cooperative nonmutual offers 
e Proof of proposition 3.2 
The expected per period payoff when the mechanism works at random is 
Since U is constant we need not consider it during the proof. Disregarding U the 
claim is that the expression simplifies to 2:-=-13. 
Proof in order to show this, it is sufficient to demonstrate that 
~ (n: 2) (n _ 2)n-2-"(1+ x) = (2n - 3)(n _ 1)(n-3) (5) 
This is easily seen for 71, = 3 which is the minimurn population size for the mechanism 
to be of interest. Assurning that it is true for 71, we show that it is true for n + 1. 
First we separate the surnmation into two parts by splitting (1 + x) and also 
examine separately the term for x = O and x = n - 1 of the second sumo 
Part II 
, A __________ ~, 
~ (n: 1) (n _ 1)"-H+ I:x(n: 1)(n _1)n-H + (n -1) 
x=o x=1~ 
, nn-l by VNewton J (n-l)(:=D 
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Concentrating on part 2 we redefine x = a + 1. Thus part 2 becomes 
(n -1) ~ (n: 2)(1) _1)"-2-- + (n - 1) 
= (n - 1) I: (n : 2) (n - 1 t-2- a 
a=O 
, # 
v 
(n_l)n-2 by Newton 
after adding and subtracting the term for a = n - 2. Thus the entire expression 
becomes 
which is what we get by plugging n+ 1 into the right hand side of equation 5. O 
D Sorne sirnulation results 
Unless otherwise stated results reported are based on m = 10 and w = 0.7. 
D.1 The most simple setup 
The simplest possible environment is a five player setup with each strategy being 
present once. Table VIII summarizes the offer structure and game structure that 
occurred on average over 100 independent realizatiollS. 
11 AllD 1 Rip TFT 1 TFTT 1 AllC 1 
AllD 
offers 11 1 30.6 ~:! 1 ~:! 1 ~:~ 1 
Rip ;:~: 11 ~~:~ 1 
TFT ;:~: 11 ~:! 1 ~:~ 
TFTT offers 0.6 0.7 24.3 24.4 
garnes 1.6 2.1 37.3 38.1 
AllC offers 0.5 0.4 24.3 24.8 
games 1.4 1.7 36.7 38.1 
total garnes 36.3 42.4 82.1 79.1 77.9 
Table VIII 
N otice that the total number of offers rnade by a player cannot exceed the nurnber of 
periods (which is 50) but can be lower, since there might be sorne periods in which 
no offer is made. 
Table IX illustrates how the ranking of the different strategies change on average. 
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ranking in 5 player society 
position s=l s=2 s=3 s=4 s=5 s=6 s=7 s=8-9 s=9-40 
1 AllD Rip AllD AllD TFT TFT TFT TFT TFT 
2 Rip AllD TFT TFT AllC AllC TFTT AllC AllC 
3 AllC AllC Rip AllC TFTT TFTT AllC TFTT TFTT 
4 TFT TFT AllC Rip AllD Rip AllD AllD Rip 
5 TFTT TFTT TFTT TFTT Rip AllD Rip Rip AllD 
Table IX 
AH nonexploitive strategies are already ranked better from period 5 onwards. 
The exact ranks of nonexploitive strategies in the initial period varied widely over 
the different realizations. However, the same pattern is always preserved: exploitive 
strategies perform better in the very first periods with nonexploitive strategies 
quickly overtaking their performance. 
D.!.1 Sensitivity analysis 
Table X shows sorne sensitivity results with respect to w. Only two fiarly extreme 
cases are reported. 
w =0.1 111 w=0.9 
AllD Rip TFT TFTT AllC 111 AllD Rip TFT TFTT AllC 
AllD offers 25.6 2.5 2.8 2.7 111 13.4 10.9 12.1 13.6 
games 36.6 1 1 1 111 16.7 2.1 3.3 3.6 
Rip offers 27.4 3.3 3.1 3.1 6.4 14.9 14.5 14.2 
games 36.6 1 1 1.2 16.7 7.2 5 4.9 
TFT offers 0.5 0.5 23.5 25.5 0.6 2.7 22 24.3 
games 1 1 36.9 37.8 2.1 7.2 33.5 34.2 
TFTT offers 0.2 0.3 23.1 26.4 0.7 0.6 23 25.7 
games 1 1 36.9 38.1 3.3 5 33.5 35.5 
AllC offers 0.7 0.4 24.2 24.7 0.5 0.6 23.8 25.1 
games 1 1.2 37.8 38.1 3.6 4.9 34.2 35.5 
total games 39.6 39.8 76.7 77 78.1 25.7 33.8 77 77.3 78.2 
Table X 
The lower numbers of contacts between exploitive and nonexploitive types illustrates 
the higher speed of the formation of the subpopulation with lower w. 
Table XI shows sorne sensitivity results with respect to m 
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s=41-50 
TFT_ 
TFTT 
AllC 
Rip 
AllD 
m= 15 m=20 
AllD Rip TFT TFTT AllC AllD Rip TFT TFTT AlIC 
AIlD offers 26.2 7.6 8 8 23.7 8.6 9 
games 25.2 1.6 1.8 1.6 21.5 1.5 1.5 
Rip offers 20.4 14.7 6.6 6.8 15.8 19.7 6 
games 25.2 11 2.4 2.3 21.5 16.5 1.9 
TFT offers 0.8 5.6 22 20.5 0.6 0.8 24.3 
games' 1.6 11 33.3 32.3 1.5 1G.5 36.6 
TFTT offers 0.4 0.6 23.7 25.3 0.3 0.4 24.3 
games 1.8 2.4 33.3 36 1.5 1.9 36.6 
AllC offers 0.5 0.6 22.6 26.3 0.7 0.5 24.6 24.2 
games 1.6 2.3 32.3 36 1.4 1.9 36 35.2 
total games 30.2 40.9 78.2 73.5 72.2 25.9 41.8 90.6 75.2 
Table XI 
With higher m Rip can cooperate over more periods with TFT. Consequently TFT 
becomes the most active strategy. However, the main structure does not change: 
over time nonexploitive strategies form an exclusive subpopulation. 
D.2 A 10 player population 
Table XII illustrates the average interaction between the different types in a popu-
lation of 2 AllD, 3 Rip, 2 TFT, 2 TFTT and 1 AllC players (10 player population). 
1I AllD I Rip I TFT I TFTT 1 AllC I 
AllD 53.5 4.12 1.325 1.65 1.8 
Rip 4.12 55.1 2.75 2.25 2.37 
TFT 1.325 2.75 43.9 41.9 42.2 
TFTT 1.65 2.25 41.9 43.1 44.3 
total games 73.55 130.81 180.8 181.25 183.71 
Table XII 
As can be seen, in this setup nonexploitive types interact very little with ex-
ploitive types and their level of activity (total games played) is much higher 
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